

Chapter 8

Habsburg Motherhood: The Power of Mariana of Austria, Mother and Regent for Carlos II of Spain

Silvia Z. Mitchell

“It is not clear if Salic Law has conserved the greatness of France or mostly prevented it,”¹ the Duke of Medinaceli commented with a tinge of sarcasm during the State Council deliberations on the marriage of Carlos II of Spain (ruled 1665–1700), while making the point that no diplomatic or territorial gains could be expected if the Spanish king married a French princess.² Although it was an offhand remark and not central to his main discussion, Medinaceli’s observation implicitly acknowledged that, unlike the French, the Spanish monarchy had been built on the principle of female inclusion. Habsburg women, with their substantial rights to inheritance and succession and as political partners with their husbands, children, or relatives were central to the establishment, consolidation, expansion, and survival of Habsburg rule in Spain. Members of the State Council had been pointedly reminded of this dynastic strategy: since 1674 they had met numerous times to debate the marriage between Carlos II and his niece, Archduchess Maria Antonia of Austria (1670–1692), who was not only a potential royal bride, but the heiress to the Spanish throne.³ At the time, another Habsburg woman by birth and


¹ “Demas que aquella Ley Salica que no es facil determinar si ha conservado la Grandeza de Franzia o estorvadosela mayor.” Juan Francisco de la Cerda, VIII Duke of Medinaceli (1637–1691), State Council deliberations, April 24, 1676. AHN Estado, leg. 2799. All translations are mine.

² Salic Law refers to the juridical principle that women were excluded from inheriting the throne. Although scholars now agree that Salic Law was an “invention” of early modern jurists, it was in use nevertheless in France. See Viennot and Hanley. Salic Law was introduced in Spain by Philip V (ruled 1700–1746), a Bourbon by birth, although it was never fully accepted, and Isabel II inherited the throne in 1833.

³ They met to consider Maria Antonia and other potential brides on December 30, 1674, June 4, 1676, June 16 and 18, July 8, August 2 and 15, and November 26, 1677, and January 7, 11, 19, 21 and April 3 and 13, 1679. Maria Antonia remained a focus of the discussions until the very end, precisely because of her rights to the succession. She became the heiress to the Spanish throne after the death of her mother, Empress Margarita of Austria (1651–1673), who had been named second in the line of succession after her brother Carlos in Philip IV’s testament. The topic was extensively debated, and several ministers suggested that whether or not she married the king, the little archduchess should be reared in Spain in

marriage, the king's mother, Queen Mariana of Austria (1634–1696), dominated the political stage for more than a decade both during and after her son's minority.

Table 8.1 Genealogical chart, Mariana de Austria



In spite of her preeminent political role during Carlos II's reign, scholars have either ignored or portrayed Mariana's regency in a negative light, given the chaotic events of her rule:⁴ the spectacular rise of two unpopular favorites, her confessor, the Jesuit Everard Nithard (1607–1681), and her protégé, the courtier Fernando Valenzuela (1630–1692); their equally dramatic fall from power in 1669 and 1676, respectively; the queen's exile in 1677; and her substitution at court by a strong masculine figure, Carlos II's older half-brother, Don Juan of Austria (1629–1679), from 1677 to 1679. Not surprisingly, Mariana has long suffered from her own black legend, and her rule been often misunderstood. Historians writing in the 1980s, for example, assumed that Mariana had no real power and what little she had, she willingly surrendered to her favorites. They unanimously considered her unfit to rule a vast Empire and uninterested in politics, with a few even venturing that she was ignorant.⁵ A new generation of scholars is gradually rendering obsolete these dismissive and largely unsubstantiated notions through perceptive gender analysis and rigorous archival research.⁶ Indeed, several recent studies suggest that Mariana's power should be considered as part of a culture that sustained multiple forms of female authority. Her regency was sanctioned by her

order to Castilianize her in case she inherited the monarchy. See for example, the opinions of the duke of Osuna, the admiral of Castile, the duke of Alburquerque, and the constable of Castile during the State Council deliberations of 1674 and 1676 (AHN E., leg. 2799).

⁴ See for example, the important study by Maura y Gamazo.

⁵ Tomás y Valiente 19; Domínguez Ortiz, ed., "Introducción," *Testamento de Felipe IV* xxxiii; Lynch 258; and Kamen 329.

⁶ Oliván Santaliestra, *Mariana de Austria* and "Mariana de Austria" and Llorente. See also Campbell and Goodman.

husband, Philip IV's (r.1621–1665) testament,⁷ which was in turn based on well-established Iberian and Habsburg political traditions,⁸ in line with the obvious preference among the aristocracy to choose mothers as guardians of heirs,⁹ and endorsed by a culture and a society that viewed widows and mothers as powerful figures.¹⁰

Fittingly, Mariana assumed her reign as regent with undisputed legitimacy and extensive authority. Even though factional struggles abounded, during her son's minority, opposition to Mariana was directed against her favorites, rather than directly against her, and she completed her tenure in office as stipulated in the king's testament. A political crisis soon erupted, first timidly and then to the point of civil war, just as Carlos came of age on his fourteenth birthday, when her juridical status significantly changed. At this critical transition of power neither was the mother ready to surrender authority, nor the son prepared to take it from her. The political discourse that circulated in Madrid during this crossroads in Mariana's and Carlos's political trajectory offers an ideal opportunity to probe into the nature and extent of her power. In what follows, I investigate specific aspects of Mariana's power to shed light on the queen and the politics of the court during her reign, and identify the wide range of possibilities, as well as the dangers, of female authority in early modern Spain.

“With the Same Authority as the King”

According to the terms of Philip IV's testament, Mariana reigned with the titles of “tutor” and “governor” from September 17, 1665, the day the king died, until November 6, 1675, the day of Carlos II's fourteenth birthday.¹¹ During this time, Mariana's signature possessed the same weight of that of a sovereign ruler and can be found in hundreds of state documents, a significant number of which she evidently examined personally. Mariana's hand-written and dictated commentaries on many of these, her communications with several secretaries, her private correspondence, and her direct intervention in diplomatic affairs strongly suggest that the queen participated actively in the government of the monarchy. The nature and effectiveness of her policies certainly need to be studied and evaluated further, although it is by now clear that she resolutely exercised authority.¹²

⁷ Domínguez Ortiz, ed. *Testamento de Felipe IV*.

⁸ For Iberian traditions see Earenfight, “Partners in Politics” and *The King's Other Body*. The Habsburgs often named female relatives during minorities and absences. Female governorships, for instance, were particularly common in the Spanish Low Countries, ruled by women for much of the sixteenth century.

⁹ See Coolidge.

¹⁰ For instance, see Nader and Fink De Backer.

¹¹ Domínguez Ortiz, ed. *Testamento de Felipe IV*, clause 21, 40–43 (see below for the text).

¹² For a concise study of Mariana's foreign policy see Sánchez Belén.

Philip IV set up a unified regency for Mariana, giving her guardianship rights as the king's "tutor" and political authority as the monarchy's "governor."¹³ He established a Regency Council to function as an advisory board during her reign. This new government body acted in a strictly consultative capacity, and even though Philip required Mariana to consider their opinions, she was not obligated to abide by them.¹⁴ Philip secured Mariana's authority repeatedly and unequivocally in clauses 21 and 35 of the testament by making the following statements:

"I name the queen, doña Mariana, governor and tutor ... with all the faculties and power that I can give her ... she can begin governing from the day of my death in the same manner and with the same authority that I do... it is my will to communicate and give her [the authority] that I have, and all that is necessary ... I do not withhold anything ... she has the entire government and direction of all my kingdoms in peace and war¹⁵ ... I do not hold back any of the faculties that I have and that she assumes as tutor, curator, and governor, including issuing or revoking laws ... I give her as much power as it resides in me for everything that is necessary and convenient ... she is entitled to use the greatest prerogatives and royal power that belong to the dignity [of kingship] ... she can do her will in everything that may be necessary and convenient."¹⁶

The transition of power from Philip IV to Mariana and Carlos took place without incidents; contemporaries accepted her position matter of factly: ministers of the Council of Aragón, for example, recorded in the minutes of September 17, 1665 that Mariana assumed the rule of the monarchy with "ample powers,"

¹³ Tutorship and governorships rights were not necessarily held by the same person during a regency. In France, for example, female regents often (although not always) shared political authority with a council. See Crawford.

¹⁴ Philip IV's decision to institute a Regency Council has been used as evidence to argue both that Mariana's sovereignty was limited and that her husband doubted her capacity to rule. Legal historian María del Carmen Sevilla González, has convincingly argued that Philip IV had no such doubts and in fact did not limit Mariana's authority with the establishment of a Regency Council.

¹⁵ "Nombro por gobernadora de todos mis reynos, estados y señoríos y tutora de el Príncipe mi hijo o hija, que me huviere de suceder, a la Reyna doña Mariana mi muy cara y amada muger, con todas las facultades y poder que ... le puedo dar ... [para que] pueda desde el día que Yo fallezca entrar a gobernar, en la misma forma, y con la misma autoridad que Yo lo hago ... mi voluntad es, comunicarle y darle la que Yo tengo, y toda la que fuere necesaria, sin reservar cosa alguna, ... para que tenga todo el gobierno y regimiento de todos mis reynos en paz y en guerra" (Domínguez Ortiz, ed., *Testamento de Felipe IV*, clause 21, 40–43).

¹⁶ "Y no reservo de la facultad que como a tutora, curadora y gobernadora le compitiere, nada de de lo que a mí me toca, aunque sea hacer y promulgar leyes de nuevo, o revocarlas ... le doy quanto poder en mí reside para todo lo necesario y conveniente y para que use de las maiores prerogativas y regalías que tocan a la Dignidad; ... y haga y obre su voluntad en quanto conviene y fuere menester" (Domínguez Ortiz, ed., *Testamento de Felipe IV*, clause 35, 50–53.)

without having to “submit anything to referendum,” and “with the same authority as the king.”¹⁷

Philip IV envisioned an active role for Mariana after the regency as well and named her “curator” of her son. He defined the prerogatives of the office in clause 34: “Once [the king] reaches his fourteenth birthday, [he] will begin governing completely, utilizing the advice and assistance of his mother and the majority opinion of the Regency Council.”¹⁸ Although Philip IV defined Mariana’s entitlement after the regency rather vaguely, the importance of the curatorship cannot be underestimated, as Mercedes Llorente indicates in her essay in this volume.¹⁹ The title, in fact, was mentioned in clause 35 and was included in some of the official documents dispatched during the minority.²⁰ According to Grace E. Coolidge, who has studied female aristocratic guardians in early modern Spain, curatorship was a form of custody established for young males from the ages of fourteen and twenty-five, and for girls from twelve to twenty-five, or until marriage for both, if it took place before (22). It was not as restrictive a form of guardianship as a tutorship, and wards of a curator, for example, could reject or nominate their own candidates for the office (Coolidge 21–2). Mariana’s juridical status, therefore, changed considerably after Carlos’s initial emancipation at the age of fourteen and she had to negotiate her subsequent political role. As we will see, Mariana decisively and successfully invoked her familial ties as mother of the king, her dynastic capital as a Habsburg in her own right, and her position as former ruler as governor of the monarchy for more than a decade in order to assert and claim political power.

From Ruler to Advisor

The court prepared for the transition from Carlos II’s royal minority to royal emancipation with an act that had profound repercussions: seven months before Carlos II’s fourteenth birthday, on April 14, 1675, Mariana established the

¹⁷ “Governadora con clausulas amplisimas ... dandole la misma autoridad q[ue] tiene el Rey sin referenciar coza alguna y tutora del Rey asta tener 14 cumplidos,” in Council of Aragon minutes recorded on September 17, 1665, the day of Philip’s death and after the testament was read publicly (AHN, Consejos, leg. 7259). The president of the Council of Aragón, Cristóbal Crespi de Valdaura, also recorded the conditions of Mariana’s rule stating in his diary that the Regency Council, of which he was a member, had consultative powers and that the queen was not obligated to submit to their votes (BNE, ms. 5742 fols 362v–363r).

¹⁸ “Y en llegando a catorce años, entrara a gobernar enteramente, valiendose de los Consejos y asistencia de su Madre, con el parecer de la maior parte de la Junta” (Dominguez Ortiz, ed. *Testamento de Felipe IV* 50–51).

¹⁹ Particularly important is Llorente’s discovery of the inventory of 1686, which coincides with Carlos II’s twenty-fifth birthday, the age limit for curatorships. Mariana’s transition from tutor and governor to that of curator is also evident in the portraiture.

²⁰ BNE ms. 5742 fol. 363r.

king's household "served exclusively by men," a step that foreshadowed the son's assumption of a political identity independent from his mother's.²¹ As was typical of the Spanish Habsburg court, the new living arrangements opened the door to intrigues and shifts of political loyalties.²² Efforts to monopolize the king's attention and direct it away from his mother and her supporters began immediately. The king greeted his coming emancipation with plans of his own, reaching out in late October to Don Juan of Austria, his older half-brother and a highly controversial figure. Don Juan, who was the only one of Philip's illegitimate children to have been legitimized, gained a well-deserved reputation as a great military figure and effective administrator. Philip IV, likely in order to protect his wife's authority, excluded Don Juan from the succession and the regency government in the testament and, as a symbol of his exclusion, did not permit him to be present at his death.²³ The king's actions contributed to the power struggles between his illegitimate son and his wife. Indeed, as soon as the regency began, Don Juan attempted to impose his presence on Mariana's regime, while the queen did everything in her power to keep him at bay. Conflicts escalated and in 1669 Don Juan pressured Mariana to dismiss her confessor and favorite with the threat of violence.²⁴ The queen caved in to his demands initially, sending Nithard to Rome as an ambassador, but shortly afterwards responded with one of the most controversial and bold moves of her reign: she established a permanent 3,000-men regiment in the seat of the court.²⁵ The regiment, controversial as it was, protected Mariana's authority, became an important source of royal patronage, and delivered an effective political blow to Don Juan.²⁶ A period of relative peace followed, during which it is evident that Mariana had gained control of the power structures of the court. As the minority came to an end, however, factional struggles resumed and culminated in the events partly described here.

²¹ The court offices of Carlos II's royal household were allocated on November 26, 1674. Carlos, however, did not move into his own chambers and, most importantly, was not served by his own officials until April 14, 1675. Thus, the later date marks the formal establishment of Carlos II's household (AGP, Reinados, caja 92, expedientes 2 and 3).

²² For instance, see the political transitions to and from the rule of Philip III in Feros and in Elliott.

²³ Philip's exclusion of Don Juan was done by default (Dominguez Ortiz, ed., *Testamento de Felipe IV*, clauses 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14).

²⁴ Maura y Gamazo I: 434.

²⁵ The regiment was informally known as La Chamberga: see Sánchez Gómez. The Council of Castile bitterly protested Mariana's move, which amounted to the establishment of a standing army in a city that prided itself on its liberties. Mariana circumvented the council with the help of Guillén Ramón de Moncada, the IV Marquis of Aytona (1615–1670), who became one of the queen's closest collaborators. Aytona's papers, housed in the private archive of the Medinaceli family, reveal the difficulties Mariana encountered in bringing the project to fruition and how controversial the move was (ADM, *Histórica*, leg. 68).

²⁶ It is not surprising that the first measure Don Juan took when he succeeded in taking over the government was to dismiss the regiment.

“On the sixth [of November], I come into the government of my states,” Carlos wrote to Don Juan, “I need your services to assist me in my duties, since I plan to say farewell to my mother.” He instructed his older brother to report to his chambers on Carlos’s birthday and keep the whole matter secret.²⁷ It is not clear to what extent Mariana knew about her son’s plans to exclude her from the new government. She anticipated any potential challenges, however, with a controversial move that precipitated a showdown between mother and son. On November 4, the queen and her Regency Council submitted a formal request to Carlos to extend his minority for an additional two years, a request that amounted to keeping his mother at the reins of the government as if nothing had changed.²⁸ Carlos refused to sign the document, appearing resolute in his decision to install Don Juan at the helm of government, and informed his mother of his intentions. On November 6, Don Juan arrived in Madrid. Publicly acclaimed at court, he met with the king privately, and by noon was on his way to the Palace of the Buen Retiro on the outskirts of Madrid, as a first step in assuming his new role in the monarchy. In the meantime, Carlos, surrounded by his courtiers, attended the religious rituals in celebration of his birthday. Conspicuously absent during the festivities, his mother purportedly remained in her quarters with one of her recurrent migraine headaches. Although Carlos’s plans seemed to go smoothly, things changed after the king met privately with his mother.

The queen’s anger and authority were unleashed on the young sovereign. Carlos reportedly came out of the private meeting giving signs he had been crying. He quickly lost his nerve and acquiesced to his mother’s demands that Don Juan be told to leave immediately.²⁹ Carlos had also been admonished by others, who invoked Mariana’s position as royal mother and regent, not to act, under any circumstance, in matters of state without her knowledge.³⁰ The king and his mother reached an agreement: Carlos extended the Regency Council for another two years without, however, prolonging his minority.³¹ Mariana relinquished her official duties on November 6 and ordered that all the official documents be addressed and submitted

²⁷ “Día seis Juro y entro al gobierno de mis Estados, necesito de vuestra persona a mi lado para esta funcion, y despedirme de la Reyna mi s[eñor]a y mi Madre, y assi Miercoles a las diez y tres quartos os hallareis en mi antecamara, y os encargo el secreto. Dios os g[uar]de. Yo el Rey.” Carlos to Don Juan, October 30, 1675 (BNE, ms. 12961.21).

²⁸ I follow Maura y Gamazo’s account of the events here and the next paragraph: II: 236–42. Laura Oliván Santaliestra has clarified some important aspects of what transpired on November 6, with the discovery of new documents (“Mariana de Austria en la encrucijada política,” chapter 5). I have drawn my own conclusions.

²⁹ After learning that the king changed his mind, Don Juan demanded proof that Carlos was acting of his own volition. Carlos issued a royal decree the same day ordering Don Juan to leave Madrid at once. To add insult to injury, he instructed his brother to proceed to the Kingdom of Sicily as his mother had initially ordered. Maura y Gamazo II: 236–42.

³⁰ Oliván, “Mariana de Austria en la encrucijada política” 278–9.

³¹ This point has been clarified by Oliván Santaliestra and is confirmed by my own archival findings.

to Carlos.³² Mariana's position, therefore, transitioned from that of a ruler with full sovereign rights to that of an advisor with vaguely defined prerogatives.

As a royal matriarch and acting ruler during her son's minority, Mariana certainly felt entitled to demand Don Juan's immediate dismissal. He had been, after all, a sworn enemy of her regime. The episode, however, had political implications that went well beyond factional and familial struggles. In forcing the king, as young as he may have been, to reverse a decision that he had made publicly only a few hours earlier, she committed a grave tactical error.

Mother versus Monarchy

Although Mariana's swift and total suppression of her son's initiative gave her the upper hand, it also signaled to all that the king was far from achieving emancipation from his mother's influence. Mariana, in fact, continued to rule with an iron fist. She exiled, dismissed, and replaced those involved in the coup against her regime. Although Carlos signed documents and dispatched secretaries, his political involvement was undoubtedly timid and Mariana persisted in directing Spain's foreign policy and ruling over court politics as if nothing had changed. Tensions escalated to dangerous levels. If conspiracies had proliferated the year before, in 1676, factions now abounded in the open. The rise of low-born courtier Fernando Valenzuela to Prime Minister and grandee of Spain provoked widespread opposition, even from those loyal to the queen.³³

Mariana's power as mother emerged at this particular juncture as a prevailing topic in the political discourse that circulated in private, political, and public circles. It has been assumed that Carlos was dominated by his mother due to his personality and physical weaknesses, a notion that fits well with the narrative of a dynasty and monarchy in the midst of their "decline" from their former position as a powerful empire.³⁴ A careful reading of contemporary texts produced during this period, including official documents, manuscripts, and correspondence, however, reveals that the influence Mariana exerted over Carlos was within conventional cultural and social norms. Carlos's initial inability to limit his mother's authority was expected and understood by his subjects. It reflected values shared by them and, I will argue, was considered a normal aspect of a young person's development. Perhaps more so than his fourteenth birthday, the separation from his mother marked a milestone in Carlos's coming of age. This was a crucial step in achieving adulthood, and claiming a masculine role, as well as a precondition for fully assuming his role as king.

³² See for example, AGS, Estado España, leg. 2700 and 2701.

³³ Valenzuela rose to a position of trust with the queen through his wife, doña María Ambrosia de Uceda y Prada, who entered Mariana's service in 1655 (AGP, Personal, caja 1049, exp. 6). His spectacular rise provoked the nobility's contempt, to a large extent due to his humble social origins.

³⁴ The idea of Spain's "decline" has been debated at length by historians. More recently, Christopher Storrs has chosen to investigate Spain's "resilience" instead of its decline.

The plans regarding Carlos's future marriage offer an ideal opportunity to observe this complex process at work, and most importantly, Mariana's role in the arrangements. The Imperial ambassador to Spain, Ferdinand Bonaventure I, Count of Harrach,³⁵ proposed Archduchess Maria Antonia of Austria as Carlos's bride when the king turned thirteen years old.³⁶ The State Council in consultation with physicians determined that Carlos had not developed sufficiently and concluded that the consummation of any marriage would have to wait at least another two or even three years.³⁷ In 1674, given the worry that Carlos did not have a younger sibling and was unable to procreate until he reached puberty, the marriage was then considered a temporary solution, since Maria Antonia would have become a queen consort with succession rights to the throne. Because the archduchess herself was only six years old, however, and in light of Carlos's incipient maturity the summer of 1676, the Council hesitated to confirm the matrimonial alliance with the Empire.³⁸ The following year, concurring unanimously that the king was at that point completely capable of cohabitating with a wife, the Council again proceeded to consider marriage options.³⁹ By late 1677, Carlos's "strength" [*robustez*] and "good health" [*buena salud*] at sixteen convinced the ministers that he should not delay his marriage to an adult bride any longer.⁴⁰

Let us see how Mariana handled the situation. Despite the State Council's opinion, Carlos's marriage to the little archduchess was announced in September 1676 with official letters to princes of Europe.⁴¹ Mariana was the force behind this decision, which had profound implications for the monarchy. It was a clear political strategy on her part designed to cement a politico-military alliance with her brother, Emperor Leopold I, and coincided with a change of policy at the Viennese court.⁴² Dynastic considerations and, as suggested in the State Council, the queen's own personal feelings worked in the archduchess's favor, since Maria Antonia was Mariana's granddaughter. Mariana's decision, nevertheless, meant that, in theory, the consummation of the marriage should be postponed until Carlos was eighteen years old, but in reality, until he was even older, as the archduchess was not expected to give birth at twelve years old.⁴³ Mariana, therefore, continued

³⁵ Harrach served as Imperial Ambassador from 1674 to 1677.

³⁶ The marriage was proposed on November 25, 1674. The discussions began on December 30, 1674. A copy of the marriage proposal can be found in AHN, E. leg. 2799.

³⁷ December 30, 1674. AHN, E. leg. 2799.

³⁸ AHN, E. leg. 2799; State Council deliberation of June 4, 1676.

³⁹ In particular see the deliberations that took place July 8, 1677 (AHN, E. leg. 2799).

⁴⁰ State Council deliberation of November 19–20, 1677 (AHN, E., leg. 2799). A month later, Carlos informed Leopold I that it was impossible for him to ratify the marriage to the young archduchess due to the age difference between the couple.

⁴¹ AHN, E. leg. 2799.

⁴² See Spielman 76–82.

⁴³ While the law allowed girls to marry at twelve years of age, State Council ministers believed that Maria Antonia would not be able to procreate until she was fifteen or sixteen years of age, as "was the custom in Spain" (AHN, E. leg. 2799, Deliberation of November 25, 1674).

to direct Spain's foreign policy by confirming a marriage alliance with the Austrian Habsburgs. Perhaps more problematic for the ruling élite was the fact that by endorsing a bride that was merely six years old, she extended Carlos's childhood and prolonged the absence of a successor for several years.

Obeisance to fathers and mothers was an integral part of the culture and, not surprisingly, one of the foundational concepts Mariana emphasized in her program for Carlos's education, for which she was responsible as the king's "tutor." In the educational treatise *Nudrición Real* that Mariana commissioned in 1671 from Pedro González de Salcedo, "reverence to parents" is placed high in the hierarchy of moral concepts to be inculcated to the young king, second only to "fear of God," and above "love to subjects."⁴⁴ An entire chapter is devoted to explaining how "Royal parents should teach their children the natural dictum of loving and fearing them." Children should venerate their parents, "as if they were gods on earth."⁴⁵ Violating this important precept was a "horrendous crime" that brought about both divine and earthly judgments, provoking "divine indignation" from the heavenly court, and "loathing and contempt" from men.⁴⁶ As a mother, a widow, and an older woman, the queen mother was a powerful figure, and Salcedo often referred to Mariana as "the Supreme Royal Maternity."⁴⁷

Notions about powerful motherhood had evidently influenced the ruling élite's expectations about Carlos's demeanor towards his mother. In describing the two-hour meeting in which Mariana convinced Carlos to ask Don Juan to leave Madrid, after he had personally called him to the city, a gazetteer explained that his mother "triumphed with tears and persuasions over the young king, barely fourteen years of age."⁴⁸ In a private memorandum, the president of the Council of Castile wrote persuasively to Carlos that "because Your Majesty is under the influence of the *reverential fear* of your mother, it is clear that Your Majesty is overwhelmed and cannot govern by himself" (my italics).⁴⁹ The very moral precept that was an integral part of a king's education was also an obvious impediment to the exercise of sovereignty.

As a young king, Carlos was thus put in a very difficult position. How was he to observe the expected reverential fear of his mother and at the same time emancipate

⁴⁴ Pedro González de Salcedo, *Nudrición Real (Texto impreso). Reglas o preceptos de como se ha de educar a los Reyes Mozos, desde los siete a los catorce años ... A la Reyna Nuestra Señora* (BNE R5175).

⁴⁵ "Que deven los Padres Reyes enseñar a sus hijos en el Precepto natural de amarlos, y temerlos" Salcedo 54.

⁴⁶ "[Q]ue los que no aman, y temen a sus Padres, están condenados en dos juizios, en el Consejo sumo de Dios, y en el Tribunal de los hombres, padeciendo en aquel justos castigos de la indignacion Divina; y entre los hombres, aborrecimiento, y menosprecio" (González de Salcedo 54–5).

⁴⁷ "Suprema Maternidad Real" (González de Salcedo, n.p.)

⁴⁸ "[A]cavada la fiesta de la capilla volvió S[u] M[agestad] a ver a su madre cuias persuasiones y lágrimas triunfaron de 14 años escassamente cumplidos" (BNE, ms. 10129).

⁴⁹ "[Y] que trascendiendo a V[uestra] M[agestad] esta influencia con el miedo reverencial con que atiende a su Madre, se saca la consecuencia, de que V[uestra] M[agestad] está violentado, y no gobierna por sí" (ADM, Histórica, leg. 159).

himself from her power? Those close to him understood Carlos's predicament. Shortly after he took over the office of Prime Minister, Don Juan commissioned a text that may offer some answers. It recorded a supposed encounter between him, Carlos, and a Franciscan friar: "The true relation of a colloquy that for the space of one hour took place between Don Carlos II, of 16 years of age, ... Don Juan of Austria, of 48 years of age, and a friar and theologian, of 67 years of age ... in the royal palace on April 4, 1677."⁵⁰ Written by the friar, who had the compounded moral authority of age and religion, the text captures Carlos's dilemma.

The author, for example, praised Carlos's potential, but also indicated that the king was still too young: "Sir, I cannot ignore my duty to inform you that even though your royal talent is in conformity with your sovereign greatness, you have no experience; Your Majesty is still a child."⁵¹ Yet, Carlos's recent decision to separate from his mother demonstrated that the king was exhibiting clear signs of maturity:

It is true what God said, that in getting married, the man leaves his father and mother to be with his wife for the rest of his life. And your Majesty is now married to the Monarchy. How could one otherwise explain the impetus and strength Your Majesty received to wean yourself from your mother's breast, and separate from your Saintly Mother, the Queen, who gave you life, bore you, nourished you, and educated you, so that Your Majesty is better able to assist, govern, and defend your wife, the monarchy[?]⁵²

Mother and monarchy emerge as two female figures competing against each other for Carlos's love. The king appears torn between the hold each have on him: one dominates, the other submits. Indeed, the language used to describe Mariana brings to light powerful cultural, social, and political images of motherhood in general,

⁵⁰ "Historia Verdadera del coloquio que por espacio de una hora se hizo entre el semiss[jimo] señor Don Carlos 2º, Monarca de las españas, de edad de deciseis Años y El S[eño]r Don Juan de Austria de edad de 48 y un Relig[ios]o sacerdote Teologo, y su, Vasallo, De hedad de 67; de religioso 57, de la orden de N.P. S. Franc[isc]o Estando Todos tres enpie en Un triangulo a 4 de Abril en el año 1677, en su Real Palacio luego escrita del mesmo Religioso para memoria delos Venideros y consuelo de sus Vasallos, y para dar muchas gracias a Dios de averles dado tal y tan Gran Rey y señor detanta Real Capacidad. Y para esperar de Dios por su Medio muchos favores, y la restauracion de su Catholica Monarchia" (RAH, ms. 9-5135). If the date of the text is correct, Carlos was 15 years old. He had entered however, the sixteenth year of his life, another way to denote chronological age during the period.

⁵¹ "Señor, no puedo dejar de dezirle, que aun que su Real talento es conforme al solio tan soberano; No por esto tiene lo experimental en ello, siendo V[uestra] Ma[g]esta[d] niño" (RAH, ms. 9-5135).

⁵² "Es cierto lo que Dios dixo, que en casandose el hombre, dexara a su Padre y Madre; y se estara siempre con su muxer ya V[uestra] Mag[esta]d sea casado con su Monarchia; pues digamos señor quien dio a V[uestra] Mag[esta]d tanto balor en destetarse, y apartarse de su santa Madre la Reyna, que le dio el ser con la xenitura, parto, Crianza, y educazion, para asistir, gobernar, y defender a su Mujer la Monarchia de mexor" (RAH, ms. 9-5135).

and queen mothers in particular. It was obviously terribly difficult to separate from the queen, “Your Saintly Mother, who gave you life, bore you, nourished you, and educated you.”⁵³ Carlos II’s allegorical wife, on the other hand, willingly submits to her husband. Yet, by doing so, she poses a claim on him just as powerful as that of the mother: he must assume the responsibility of defending and protecting her.

The passage, therefore, conforms to those cultural values that emphasize respect and reverence for mothers, but strongly suggests that Carlos’s separation from his mother was also an inescapable precondition to his ability to become a husband to his wife, the Spanish monarchy. In this text, Marriage embodied both social and political concepts. First, as one of the benchmarks used to determine legal emancipation, it presented the king as an adult male.⁵⁴ But also, Carlos’s marriage to the monarchy described an essential aspect of Spanish political culture: the submission of the wife to the husband spoke of that of subject to ruler, and the duty of the husband to the wife also referred to the ruler’s obligation to “assist, govern, and defend” his subjects. This responsibility was powerful enough to help Carlos take the huge step of separating from his mother. The author suggested that nothing less than the strength of an entire monarchy provided the young king the “impetus” to wean himself [*destetarse*].

The ability for a son to wean himself from his mother was crucial to the assertion of maturity and even masculinity, both of paramount importance for a ruler. Sebastián de Covarrubias, author of the popular seventeenth-century dictionary, *Tesoro de la lengua española o castellana*, refers to a proverb in his definition of *niño* [male child]: “There are youths that are such mama’s boys that although they are old, they do not know how to free themselves from their mother’s lap; these turn out to be either greatly stupid or vicious rogues.”⁵⁵ Being a “mama’s boy,” indeed, provoked scorn, resulted in character flaws, and prevented a youth from reaching adulthood. For Carlos, the stakes were even higher.

The Politics of Motherhood

As soon as Mariana prevailed over her son’s decision to call Don Juan to court in such a public and decisive manner, the court was engulfed in a political crisis that was to a large extent a crisis of kingship. Having his own royal household and signing government papers was not enough for Carlos to fully assume his place as king. A crucial aspect of his coming of age had to be demonstrated in relationship to his mother, who up to that point had too much control over the young sovereign, infantilizing and perhaps even emasculating him. In a missive he wrote to Cardinal Pascual Aragón as the conspiracies against Mariana increased, the Duke of Alba,

⁵³ RAH, ms.. 9-5135.

⁵⁴ Young Spanish males could become of age at twenty-five years old, when they married, or if their fathers died, at the age of fourteen (Coolidge 22).

⁵⁵ “[H]ay algunos muchachos tan regalones que con ser grandes no saben desasirse del regazo de sus madres; salen éstos grandes tontos o grandes bellacos viciosos” (Covarrubias 778).

one of the leading rebellious nobles, encapsulated the situation perfectly: “So long as the queen mother continues to be close to the king, we will not obey in anything, because it will not be the king who orders us, but his mother.”⁵⁶

Indeed, in late 1676, twenty-four members of the upper nobility formed a confederation and demanded not only Valenzuela’s fall and his substitution by Don Juan, but most importantly, the permanent separation of Carlos from Mariana.⁵⁷ The confederation’s document bluntly identifies the king’s mother as the “root of all troubles.”⁵⁸ Her “bad influence” on the king has “produced all the malaise, losses, ruins, and disorders, that we have experimented of late, particularly, the execrable elevation [of Valenzuela].” The best service to the king, the grandees wrote, was to “separate completely and permanently the mother from the son.”⁵⁹ These strong words reflect the utter control Mariana had over her son and the monarchy structures, and the perception that her maternal power was dangerous to the body politic.

At this point Carlos was forced to choose between loyalty to his mother and the well-being of his monarchy. A short note that Carlos wrote to Medinaceli illustrates his dilemma:

I was with my mother and she told me that I should be aware that she did not wish to be involved in this mess, but I can see that she did not really want to get out of the situation. She told me that if I thought it was appropriate to force her out of there, that I should do what I thought best. I told her that I was going to consider [the state of affairs] and I was going to give her an answer tomorrow; so I order you to see what we can do about all of this, so that we can get out of this mess as soon as possible.⁶⁰

⁵⁶ “[M]ientras estubiere la Reyna madre al lado de su hijo, no obedeceremos nada que nos mande: porque no sera el Rey quien nos mande, sino su madre” (BNE, ms. 18655.25. Duke of Alba to Cardinal Aragón, n.d.).

⁵⁷ *Confederación del S[eñor] Don Juan de Austria, y los grandes de España* (BNE, ms. 18211).

⁵⁸ *Confederación del S[eñor] Don Juan de Austria, y los grandes de España* (BNE, ms. 18211 fol. 19r). Twenty-four members of the higher aristocracy signed this important document, including Don Juan. It should be also noted that five were women, at least four of whom were heads of their respective lineages.

⁵⁹ “Por causa de las malas influencias y asistencias al lado de S[u] M[agestad] dela Reyna su Madre, dela qual como primera raiz se han producido, y producen quantos males, perdidas, ruinas, y desordenes experimentamos, y la mayor parte de todas, la execrable elevación [de Fernando Valenzuela] ... evidencia que el mayor serbicio que se puede hacer a S[u] M[agestad] es separar totalmente, y para siempre, cercanía de S[u] M[agestad] a la Reyna su Madre” (BNE, ms. 18211 fol. 19r).

⁶⁰ “Estube con mi madre y me dijo que bien podia creer que ella deseaba salir de este cuento y yo bi que tenia gran gana de no salir de alli pero me dijo que no obstante yo biera si era bien hechalla de alli pero que no obstante todo esto yo yciera lo que tubiera por bien yo con estos la dije que lo beria y la responderia mañana y asi te mando que beas lo que te parece que agamos en esto para salir quanto antes de este enredo” (ADM, Histórica, leg. 160, No. 73. Holograph note by Carlos to the duke of Medinaceli, n.d.).

Mariana probably knew at this point that she had become a political liability; yet, as the content of the letter indicates, she expected her son to protect her interests at all costs. Her outlook, besides being the result of her strong personality, was rooted in social and cultural norms that invested Spanish matriarchs with tremendous amount of authority.

As the possibility of popular revolt loomed over the city during the dangerous weeks of early January,⁶¹ Carlos actively discussed his options with some of his ministers and asked one of them to write down the points that had been made to him orally [*a boca*]. Carlos's request gave way to a seminal text, written by Don Pedro Núñez de Guzmán, Marquis of Montealegre and Count of Villaumbrosa. This talented minister, who ended up playing a crucial role in the events of early 1677, had been appointed by Mariana as president of the Council of Castile, a post that gave him automatic membership in the Regency Council. Villaumbrosa's text was intended for the king, but circulated widely and was mentioned in several gazettes.⁶² It provides eloquent evidence of the central role played by Mariana's power, in this case stemming from her role as mother, in the political crisis that led the court to the brink of civil war in early 1677.

After counseling the king on the imperative to act with moderation in order to avoid a civil war, Villaumbrosa addressed what he considered the "main purpose" of his exposition and the motivation behind Don Juan's actions, "Your majesty must separate from the queen, our lady, and she must relinquish the government."⁶³ "It is understood," Villaumbrosa stated eloquently, "that so long as the queen is in the government, Valenzuela will continue playing the part he has played thus far; and because your majesty is under the influence of the reverential fear of your mother, it is clear that your majesty is overwhelmed and cannot govern by himself."⁶⁴ Villaumbrosa's text was so eloquent because it put into words the political consensus of the court: Mariana impeded Carlos's ability to assume the office of king.

⁶¹ Maura y Gamazo II: 327–8; BNE, ms. 9399 fol. 62r.

⁶² Copies can be found in several archives. I am using the one found with the Medinaceli papers: ADM, Histórica leg. 159. The text was dated January 13, 1677. Carlos moved out of the palace on the following day, January 14.

⁶³ "El punto mas arduo de esta materia ... siendo el que Juzgo es el principal que trae el Señor D[o]n Juan en su empeño: Este es, el que se aparte de V[uestra] M[agestad] la Reyna nuestra Señora, y que deje el gobierno" (ADM, Histórica, leg. 159). The idea that Don Juan's main purpose was to remove Mariana from the court was repeated in other texts that circulated in Madrid. For instance, a gazetteer reported that after the separation, Carlos and his companions "had to consider the very delicate issue of how to get the queen mother out of the court, which was, after all, Don Juan's major effort [entrose despues en el dificil punto de sacar la Reyna Madre de la Corte, que era lo que don Juan mas esforzava]" (BNE, ms. 9399 fol. 64r).

⁶⁴ "Que practicamente se entiende que estando la Reyna nuestra Señora en el gobierno ha de tener el Marques la parte que ha tenido hasta ahora, y que transcendiendo a V[uestra] M[agestad] esta influencia con la fuerza del miedo reverencial con que atiende a su Madre, se saca la consecuencia, de que V[uestra] M[agestad] esta violentado, y no gobierna por si" (ADM, Histórica, leg. 159).

Villaumbrosa then proceeded to outline a plan so that the king could separate from his mother, without neglecting to observe the appropriate reverence and respect due to a royal matriarch like Mariana. His preoccupation suggests that Carlos and his ministers found themselves in a difficult position as they attempted to remove Mariana from the court. “If the queen has resolved to leave the government, as I understand it,” he proposed, “your majesty should publish it with royal decrees sent to the councils, with the most affectionate words and *with the esteem appropriate of those of a son to a mother*” (my italics).⁶⁵ Then, the king should move to another residence. If Carlos lived for a time in the Palace of the Buen Retiro, Villaumbrosa suggested, the queen could stay in the Alcázar. This temporary solution would give her the chance to move out of the palace at her own leisure. In Villaumbrosa’s plan, the separation of mother and son was to take place placidly and harmoniously. While Carlos began to assume the government of the monarchy, assisted by Don Juan, “the queen would be able to live in the quiet and peacefulness of her state, taking a breath from the amount of work and difficulties that she suffered while at the reins of the government, *venerated and assisted by your majesty with all the appropriate decency, convenience, and affection*” (my italics).⁶⁶

Villaumbrosa’s suggestion was based on traditions that encouraged women to observe a secluded life once they became widows.⁶⁷ The Habsburg dynasty also subscribed to the idea of “retirement,” an example set by Emperor Charles V when he abdicated the throne in 1556.⁶⁸ Cultural expectations were at times in direct opposition to the practical realities of early modern Spanish widows, who played an active role in the economic, social, and cultural lives of their communities.⁶⁹ Many Habsburg women continued to participate in dynastic and political matters in widowhood.⁷⁰ Yet aristocratic and Habsburg women often adopted the monastic habit once they became widows, suggesting that they accepted the idea of seclusion.⁷¹ By invoking these traditions, Villaumbrosa justified Mariana’s exile, masking it as a retirement, and paved the way for the queen to exit the political stage in a dignified manner.

⁶⁵ “Y quedaba solo la causa de la Reyna nuestra Señora, que el Señor D[o]n Juan, y todos han de atender con toda veneracion, y respeto y es que si la Reyna nuestra Señora esta resuelta a apartarse del gobierno (como lo tengo entendido) V[uestra] M[agestad] lo publique con Decretos a los Consejos con las palabras de mas cariño, y estimacion que sean propias de tal hijo a tal madre” (ADM, Histórica, leg. 159).

⁶⁶ “La Reyna nuestra Señora vivirá en la quietud de su Estado, respirando del trabajo, y contratiempos que ha padecido en su gobierno, venerada, y asistida de V[uestra] M[agestad] en todo quanto tocara a su decencia, conveniencia, y cariño” (ADM, Histórica, leg. 159).

⁶⁷ See Vives, *Instruction*, Book III: “On Widows,” 299–326.

⁶⁸ Many women of the dynasty followed this tradition, either professing in a religious institution or adopting the Franciscan monastic habit.

⁶⁹ For aristocratic widows, see Coolidge; for urban widows in Toledo, see De Backer.

⁷⁰ For an example, see the political role played by Empress María of Austria (1528–1603) in the court of Philip III studied by Sánchez.

⁷¹ See Wyhe’s essay in this collection for a more detailed explanation as well as Llorente’s discussion of Mariana’s appearance in the regency portraits.

Carlos moved out on January 14 under the utmost secrecy. Reportedly, the king was “more obedient to necessity than to the mother,” a comment that reinforces the idea of the young sovereign having to choose between his mother and the monarchy.⁷² Although for the modern observer, the way Carlos took the big step is reminiscent of a comic-drama, it was evidently no laughing matter for those involved.⁷³ After everyone had retired for the night, at about ten in the evening, Carlos, who had gone to bed earlier, got up and dressed again, helped by Medinaceli, the *summiller de corps*. “With great demonstration of cleverness,” reported a gazette, the king and Medinaceli locked up the servants in attendance in a room in the Alcázar so that they would not report the king’s absence.⁷⁴ They proceeded through the palace, going across the gardens quickly in order not to be discovered. They met the Master of the Horse in the back of the palace, who was already waiting with the royal carriage to transport them to the Palace of the Buen Retiro, where they arrived after midnight. Carlos was accompanied by a handful of people, four noblemen and three servants.⁷⁵ The sneaking manner used by the ruler of the largest empire in the Western world to separate from his mother reveals the nature and extent of Mariana’s power perhaps as much as Philip IV’s testamentary clauses.

Once the king left her side, Mariana’s position weakened substantially, and soon she ran out of recourses to win this political battle. She began to actively stage her comeback soon after, however. During her exile, which began on March 2, 1677 and lasted for two and a half years, Mariana gradually established a dynamic written and oral communication network between Madrid and Toledo, her new place of residence. By 1678, there is evidence that a number of people have taken the role of mediators between mother and son, including her beloved court dwarf, Nicolás Pertuso; her Grand Master of the Household, the Marquis of Mancera; Carlos’s *summiller de corps*, Medinaceli (whose participation reveals that Mariana was gaining political support among those who had opposed her); and several other figures.⁷⁶ All of these people brought information back and forth (sometimes twice a day) of a personal, political, and administrative nature. They conveyed information to the queen about Carlos’s health and well-being, which reinforced her maternal role and at the same time reminded the king of his mother, whom he reportedly missed a lot. In her letters to Carlos during this period, Mariana emphasized her motherly love with all the political weight that it carried. She signed all of her letters “Your mother who loves you best” [*Tu Madre que más te quiere*], spoke often of her “consolation” at receiving news of her son’s health, cheered all of his activities, and urged her son to write to her more often. For Carlos’s sixteenth birthday, she sent him a portrait of herself set in a splendid frame decorated with eight large diamonds.⁷⁷

⁷² BNE, ms. 9399 fol. 62v.

⁷³ The descriptions of these events have been taken from Maura y Gamazo II: 334, and BNE, ms. 10129.

⁷⁴ BNE, ms. 10129.

⁷⁵ BNE, ms. 10129 fols 7v–8r., and Maura y Gamazo II: 334.

⁷⁶ AHN, E. leg. 2729.

⁷⁷ Maura y Gamazo II: 403.

The significance of this gift cannot be underestimated, considering the affective and otherwise symbolic functions of portraits in early modern society.

Although she was in exile and supposedly excluded from the government, Mariana asserted her rights to participate in the political life of her son and monarchy. She kept a hefty diplomatic correspondence with the Count of Harrach and the Imperial court, acting behind the scenes in support of Carlos's marriage to her granddaughter.⁷⁸ She had no qualms about requesting State documents for her examination, and Carlos had no choice but to comply, often sending his mother copies of official papers to her secretary.⁷⁹ The important issue of Carlos's marriage, however, brought the queen to the political forefront again, as she was asked to intercede on behalf of Spain and her son with the Emperor. After intense deliberations in 1677 and 1678, the little archduchess was unanimously rejected by the State Council in favor of the French princess, María Luisa of Orleans (1662–1689), who was of sufficient age to provide an heir immediately and offered at least hope of a lasting peace with the French.⁸⁰ In early 1679, Carlos and his ministers faced the prospect of having to inform the emperor about the final decision, risking a break of diplomatic relations with the Empire, and Mariana appeared as the only person capable to help them out of their predicament. Her political weight as the former ruler of the monarchy, the king's mother, and the grandmother of the rejected bride gave her extraordinary authority with the emperor, who was also her brother. It seems quite appropriate to wrap up this snapshot of Mariana's trajectory in the Spanish court with another opinion by Medinaceli recorded in the State Council's deliberations on January 11:

The great love that the queen, our lady, has towards your majesty and that which she has always shown to this monarchy will always prevail in her judgment She would certainly be the most natural and convenient person to make the emperor understand that ultimately she is the only one who has the right to force your majesty alter what has already been decided.⁸¹

Mariana's intervention, as Medinaceli predicted, proved crucial in solving the delicate diplomatic situation. Carlos was grateful to his mother, writing on May 4, 1679: "I am certain that you had the main part in ensuring the good way in which

⁷⁸ Oliván Santaliestra, "Mariana de Austria en la encrucijada política" 410–16. There are about 25 letters between Mariana and Harrach, from March 9 to August 10, 1677. I thank Dr. Oliván Santaliestra for providing this information, e-mail communication April 29, 2010.

⁷⁹ For some examples: April 8, 13, 14, and 19, May 21, July 23 and 25, and December 20, 1678, and July 21, 1679 (AHN, E. leg. 2729).

⁸⁰ AHN E. leg. 2796. The marriage was decided immediately after the Peace of Nijmegen, in January 1679.

⁸¹ "Creiendo el que vota, que en el sumo amor de la Reyna n[uest]ra S[eñ]ora a V[uestra] Mag[esta]d y el con que a mirado siempre a esta Monarchia prevalecera en su alta cons[s]ideraci[on] ... siendo el medio mas natural y mas conven[ien]te Su Mag[esta]d para dar a entender al S[eñ]or Emperador que solo ella puede obligar a V[uestra] Mag[esta]d a alterar lo que tenia deliverado" (AHN, E. leg. 2796).

my uncle took the news of this business and his recognition that I cannot postpone getting married.”⁸²

Mariana’s role in solving Carlos’s problem, opposition to Don Juan’s regime, and a healthy distance between mother and son contributed to Mariana’s reemergence as a political figure in her own right. By the summer of 1679, Mariana’s restitution at court was imminent and widely expected at court and in diplomatic circles.⁸³ Don Juan’s death on September 17 accelerated the event, which took place a week later. The queen entered Madrid “received by the hearts of everyone with such acclamations and general applause that it is hard to comprehend or explain,” reported a gazette.⁸⁴ The Venetian ambassador commented that it was “a triumph and a very rare lesson in Divine Justice.”⁸⁵

Although Mariana’s extensive power proved to be dangerous at the end of her regency and led to her exile, it ultimately facilitated her return and subsequent political involvement at court and in the European stage, which continued uninterrupted until her death in 1696. Mariana’s power was formal and informal, based on legal structures and cultural values, rooted in familial, dynastic, and political networks, and social and psychological in nature. With all of these attributes working at unison, Mariana expressed a conspicuous and powerful case of Habsburg motherhood.

Works Cited

- Archivo Ducal Medinaceli, Seville and Toledo (ADM). Sección Histórica leg. 68.
 Archivo Ducal Medinaceli, Seville and Toledo (ADM). Sección Histórica leg. 159.
 Archivo Ducal Medinaceli, Seville and Toledo (ADM). Sección Histórica, leg. 160, No. 73.
 Archivo General del Palacio, Madrid (AGP). Reinados Carlos II, caja 92, expediente 3.
 Archivo General del Palacio, Madrid (AGP). Personal, caja 1049, expediente 6.
 Archivo General de Simancas (AGS). Estado, España leg. 2700.
 Archivo General de Simancas (AGS). Estado, España leg. 2701.
 Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid (AHN). Estado, leg. 2729.

⁸² “Y estoy bien cierto q[ue] abras tenido la principal parte en q[ue] la buena forma en q[ue] mi tio a tomado este neg[goci]o y en q[ue] reconozca lo preciso y conben[ien]te q[ue] es para todo el no perder ora de tiempo q[ue] yo tome estado ...” Carlos to Mariana, May 4, 1679. AHN E. leg. 2729.

⁸³ This is abundantly documented. For example, see Marquis of Villars 28–9. He was the French Ambassador in Madrid.

⁸⁴ “Al tiempo que el Rey tomaba ya los coches acompañado delos desterrados para ir a Toledo con tal celeridad que mostro bien la violencia y opresion en que estaba, y bolbiendo poco despues a la corte, le siguió la Reyna que hizo su entrada rezibida delos corazones de todos con aclamazion y aplauso tal, que no puede comprehenderse ni esplicarse” (BNE, ms. 9399, fol. 85r).

⁸⁵ “Il ritorno fu trionfo ed un ammaestramento ben raro della giustizia divina” Federico Cornaro, Venetian ambassador to Madrid (1678–1681). (Barozzi and Berchet 446).

- Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid (AHN). Estado, leg. 2796.
- Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid (AHN). Estado, leg. 2799.
- Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid (AHN). Consejos, leg. 7259.
- Barozzi, Nicolò and Guglielmo Berchet, eds. *Relazioni degli Stati Europei lette al Senato dagli Ambasciatori Veneti nel secolo decimosettimo. Raccolte ed annotate*. Serie I; Spain. Vol. II. Venice: Pietro Naratovich, 1860.
- Biblioteca Nacional de España (BNE). Ms. R5175.
- Biblioteca Nacional de España (BNE). Ms. 5742.
- Biblioteca Nacional de España (BNE). Ms. 9399.
- Biblioteca Nacional de España (BNE). Ms. 10129.
- Biblioteca Nacional de España (BNE). Ms. 12961.21.
- Biblioteca Nacional de España (BNE). Ms. 18211.
- Biblioteca Nacional de España (BNE). Ms. 18655.25.
- Campbell, JoEllen M. "Women and Factionalism in the Court of Charles II of Spain." In *Spanish Women in the Golden Age*. Ed. Magdalena S. Sánchez and Alain Saint-Saëns. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1996. 109–24.
- Coolidge, Grace E. *Guardianship, Gender, and the Nobility in Early Modern Spain*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010.
- Covarrubias, Sebastián de. *Tesoro de la lengua castellana o española*. 2nd edition. Ed. Felipe C.R. Maldonado. Madrid: Castalia, 1995.
- Crawford, Katherine. *Perilous Performances: Gender and Regency in Early Modern France*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004.
- Domínguez Ortiz, Antonio, ed. *Testamento de Felipe IV*. Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1982.
- Earenfight, Theresa. "Partners in Politics." In *Queenship and Political Power in Medieval and Early Modern Spain*. Ed. Theresa Earenfight. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005. xiii–xxviii.
- . *The King's Other Body: María of Castile and the Crown of Aragon*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010.
- Elliott, John H. *The Count-Duke of Olivares: The Statesman in an Age of Decline*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1986.
- Feros, Antonio. *Kingship and Favoritism in the Spain of Philip III of Spain, 1598–1621*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- Fink De Backer, Stephanie. *Widowhood, Autonomy, and Power in Early Modern Spain*. Leiden and New York: Brill, 2010.
- González de Salcedo, Pedro. *Nudrición Real (Texto impreso). Reglas o preceptos de como se ha de educar a los Reyes Mozos, desde los siete a los catorce años.... A la Reyna Nuestra Señora*. Madrid, 1671. BNE, ms. R5175.
- Goodman, Eleanor. "Conspicuous in Her Absence: Mariana of Austria, Juan José of Austria, and the Representation of Her Power." In *Queenship and Political Power in Medieval and Early Modern Spain*. Ed. Theresa Earenfight. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005. 163–84.
- Hanley, Sarah. "The Family, the State, and the Law in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century France: The Political Ideology of Male Right versus and Early Theory of Natural Rights." *The Journal of Modern History* 78 (June 2006): 289–332.

- Kamen, Henry. *Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century, 1665–1700*. London: Longman, 1980.
- Llorente, Mercedes. “Imagen y autoridad en una regencia: Los retratos de Mariana de Austria y los límites del poder.” *Studia histórica. Historia moderna* 28 (2006): 211–38.
- Lynch, John. *Spain under the Habsburgs*. Vol. II. New York: New York University Press, 1981.
- Maura y Gamazo, Gabriel. *Carlos II y su corte. Ensayo de Reconstrucción biográfica*. 2 vols. Madrid: Revista de Archivos, Bibliotecas y Museos, 1911 and 1915.
- Nader, Helen, ed. *Power and Gender in Renaissance Spain: Eight Women of the Mendoza Family, 1450–1650*. Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2004.
- Oliván Santaliestra, Laura. *Mariana de Austria. Imagen, poder y diplomacia de una reina cortesana*. Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 2006.
- . “Mariana de Austria en la encrucijada política del siglo XVII.” Ph.D. dissertation, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 2006.
- Real Academia de la Historia, Madrid (RAH). Ms. 9-5135.
- Sánchez, Magdalena S. *The Empress, the Queen and the Nun: Women and Power at the Court of Philip III of Spain*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.
- Sánchez Belén, Juan Antonio. “Las relaciones internacionales de la monarquía Hispánica durante la regencia de doña Mariana de Austria.” *Studia histórica. Historia moderna* 20 (1999): 137–72.
- Sánchez Gómez, Rosa Isabel. “Formación, desarrollo y actividades delictivas del regimiento de ‘la Chamberga’ en Madrid durante la minoría de Carlos II.” *Torres de los Lujanes* 17 (Jan. 1991): 80–96.
- Sevilla González, María del Carmen. “La Junta de Gobierno de la minoridad del Rey Carlos II.” In *Los validos*. Ed. José Antonio Escudero. Madrid: Dykinson, 2005. 583–616.
- Spielman, John P. *Leopold I of Austria*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1977.
- Storrs, Christopher. *The Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy, 1665–1700*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- Tomás y Valiente, Francisco. *Los validos en la monarquía española del siglo XVII*. Madrid: Siglo XXI de España, 1982.
- Viennot, Eliane. *La France, les femmes et le pouvoir: L’invention de la loi salique (Ve–XVIIe siècle)*. Paris: Perrin, 2006.
- Villars, Pierre, marquis de. *Mémoires de la cour d’Espagne sous le règne de Charles II, 1678–1682*. London: Trübner & Company, 1861.
- Vives, Juan Luis. *The Education of a Christian Woman: A Sixteenth-Century Manual*. Ed. and trans. Charles Fantazzi. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000.